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Abstract
Recent studies have highlighted that deep neural
networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples. In this paper, we improve the robustness of
DNNs by utilizing techniques of Distance Metric
Learning. Specifically, we incorporate Triplet Loss,
one of the most popular Distance Metric Learning
methods, into the framework of adversarial train-
ing. Our proposed algorithm, Adversarial Training
with Triplet Loss (AT2L), substitutes the adversar-
ial example against the current model for the an-
chor of triplet loss to effectively smooth the classi-
fication boundary. Furthermore, we propose an en-
semble version of AT2L, which aggregates different
attack methods and model structures for better de-
fense effects. Our empirical studies verify that the
proposed approach can significantly improve the
robustness of DNNs without sacrificing accuracy.
Finally, we demonstrate that our specially designed
triplet loss can also be used as a regularization term
to enhance other defense methods.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely used
for security-critical tasks, including but not limited
to autonomous driving [Evtimov et al., 2017], surveil-
lance [Ouyang and Wang, 2013], biometric recognition
[Xu et al., 2017], and malware detection [Yuan et al., 2014].
However, recent studies have shown that DNNs are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples [Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Papernot et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018],
which are carefully crafted instances that can mislead
well-trained DNNs. This raises serious concerns about the
security of machine learning models in many real-world
applications.
Recently, many efforts have been made to improve the
robustness of DNNs, such as (i) using the properties of
obfuscated gradients [Athalye et al., 2018] to prevent the
attackers from obtaining the true gradient of the model,
e.g., mitigating through randomization [Xie et al., 2018],
Thermometer encoding [Buckman et al., 2018],
and Defense-GAN [Samangouei et al., 2018]; (ii)
adding adversarial examples into the training set,
e.g., Adversarial Training [Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014], scalable Adversarial Train-
ing [Kurakin et al., 2016b], and Ensemble Adversarial Train-
ing [Trame`r et al., 2018]. However, it was shown that the first
type of defense methods had been broken through by vari-
ous targeted countermeasures [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a;
He et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018]. The second type of
methods also suffers the distortion of the classification
boundary for the reason that they only import adversarial
examples against some specific types of attacks.
In this paper, we follow the framework of Adversarial
Training and introduce Triplet Loss [Schroff et al., 2015],
one of the most popular Distance Metric Learning meth-
ods, to improve the robustness by smoothing the classifica-
tion boundary. Triplet loss is designed to optimize the em-
bedding space such that data points with the same label are
closer to each other than those with different labels. The pri-
mary challenge of triplet loss is how to select representative
triplets, which are made up of three examples from two dif-
ferent classes and jointly constitute a positive pair and a neg-
ative pair. Since adversarial examples contain more informa-
tion about the decision boundary than normal examples, we
modify the anchor of triplet loss with adversarial examples
to enlarge the distance between adversarial examples and ex-
amples with different labels in the embedding space. Then,
we add this fine-grained triplet loss to the original adversarial
training process and name the new algorithm as Adversarial
Training with Triplet Loss (AT2L). We also propose an en-
semble algorithm which aggregates different types of attacks
and model structures to improve the performance. Further-
more, the proposed triplet loss can be applied to other meth-
ods as a regularization term for better robustness.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We introduce triplet loss into the adversarial training
framework and modify the anchor of triplet loss with ad-
versarial examples. We also design an ensemble version
of our method.
• We propose to take our triplet loss as a regularization
term and apply it to existing defense methods for further
improvement of robustness.
• We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate our algo-
rithms. The empirical results show that our proposed
approach behaves more robust and preserves the accu-
racy of the model, and the triplet loss can also improve
the performance of other defense methods.
2 Related work
In this section, we briefly review existing adversarial attack
and defense methods.
2.1 Attack methods
Attack methods can be divided into two main categories:
gradient-based attack and optimization-based attack.
The gradient-based attack asks for the structure of the at-
tacked model and requires that the attacked model should
be differentiable. Then it generates adversarial examples
by adding perturbation along the direction of the gradients.
FGSM [Goodfellow et al., 2014], Single-Step Least-Likely
(LL) [Kurakin et al., 2016a; Kurakin et al., 2016b] and their
iterative versions, i.e., I-FGSM and I-LL, are popular meth-
ods in this type of attack.
The optimization-based attack formulates the task of attack
as an optimization problem which aims to minimize the norm
of perturbation and make the DNN model mis-classify adver-
sarial examples. C&W attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b] is
by far one of the strongest optimization-based attacks. It can
reduce the classifiers’ accuracy to almost 0 and has bypassed
over 10 different methods designed for detecting adversarial
examples [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a]. However, it is more
time-consuming than gradient-based algorithms.
2.2 Defense methods
Many recent defense approaches are based on a technique
called obfuscated gradients [Athalye et al., 2018]. It is
similar to gradient masking [Papernot et al., 2017] which
is a failed defense method that tries to deny the at-
tacker access to a useful gradient, and leads to a false
sense of security in defenses against adversarial exam-
ples. Typical defense methods using obfuscated gra-
dients are thermometer encoding [Buckman et al., 2018],
Stochastic activation pruning [Dhillon et al., 2018], Mitigat-
ing through randomization [Xie et al., 2018] and Defense-
GAN [Samangouei et al., 2018].
Another common method is adversarial training, which
proposes to add adversarial examples to the training set and
then retrain the model for better robustness. Szegedy et al.
(2013) first propose this simple process in which the model is
trained on adversarial examples until it learns to classify them
correctly. However, this type of methods suffers the distortion
of the classification boundary. So in this paper, we introduce
Distance Metric Learning to alleviate this distortion.
3 Methodology
In this section, we first introduce the triplet loss. Then we
present Adversarial Training with Triplet Loss (AT2L) and
an ensemble version of AT2L. Finally, we propose to treat
our special triplet loss as a regularization term and combine
it with existing defense methods.
3.1 Triplet loss
A triplet [Schroff et al., 2015] consists of three examples
from two different classes, which jointly constitute a posi-
tive pair and a negative pair. We denote (xai ,x
p
i ,x
n
i ) as a
triplet, where (xai ,x
p
i ) has the same label and (x
a
i ,x
n
i ) has
the different. The xai term is referred to as the anchor of a
triplet. The distance between the positive pair is encouraged
to be smaller than that of the negative pair, and a soft nearest
neighbor classification margin is maximized by optimizing a
hinge loss. Specifically, triplet loss forces the network to gen-
erate an embedding where the distance between xai and x
n
i is
larger than the distance between xai and x
p
i plus the margin
parameter α.
Formally, we define the triplet loss function as follows:
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
{
‖f(xai )− f(x
p
i )‖
− ‖f(xai )− f(x
n
i )‖+ α, 0
}
,
where N is the cardinality of the set of triplets used in the
training process, f(·) is the output of the last fully connected
layer of our neural network, ‖xi − xj‖ represents a metric
of distance between xi and xj . Here we use ℓ∞ norm in our
experiments.
Generating all possible triplets would result in redundant
triplets and lead to slow convergence. So in the next sec-
tions, we use sampling strategy to generate triplets in our al-
gorithms.
3.2 Adversarial training with triplet loss (AT2L)
The original version of adversarial training is to craft adver-
sarial examples for the entire training set and add them to
the training process. Specifically, it generates Xadv which
contains adversarial examples of instances in training set X .
Then it concatenates Xadv and X as X
′ and retrains the
model with X ′. During each iteration of the original algo-
rithm, it generates the adversarial examples against the cur-
rent model. The loss function of the original adversarial train-
ing is formulated as:
1
(1 + λ)k
(
k∑
i=1
ℓ(xi, yi) + λ
k∑
i=1
ℓ(xadvi , yi)
)
, (1)
where λ is the hyper-parameter, k is the size of the mini-batch
sampled from X , y is the label of xi and x
adv
i is the adver-
sarial example of xi.
To encourage a larger margin between the positive class
and the negative class, we incorporate triplet loss into the loss
function. Specifically, for example xi, we generate adversar-
ial example xadvi and sampled an example x
n
i from the mini-
batch which has a different label to construct a new triplet
(xadvi ,xi,x
n
i ). The main difference between this triplet and
the original triplet is that instead of taking the original exam-
ple xi as the anchor, we choose the adversarial example x
adv
i ,
which contains more information about the decision bound-
ary. Specifically, when dealing with a binary classification
problem, we sample xni which has the opposite label to xi.
For multi-class problems, we sample xni from the same class
as the adversarial example xadvi , which is an incorrect class
from the view of human beings. We apply this new triplet
to the triplet loss, and combine it with the loss of adversarial
training, so the loss function of our algorithm is formulated
as:
ℓˆ(x, y) =
1
(1 + λ1)k
(
k∑
i=1
ℓ(xi, yi) + λ1
k∑
i=1
ℓ(xadvi , yi)
)
+
λ2
k
k∑
i=1
max
{
‖f(xadvi )− f(xi)‖
− ‖f(xadvi )− f(x
n
i )‖+ α, 0
}
,
(2)
where k is the size of a mini-batch, and λ1, λ2 and α are
the hyper-parameters. We utilize this new loss function to
retrain the model and summarize the proposed algorithm in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial training with triplet loss (AT2L)
1: Train f(·) with training dataX ;
2: repeat
3: ConstructXadv against f(·) for each instance inX ;
4: X ′ = [X ,Xadv];
5: Retrain f(·) with X ′ using Eq. (2);
6: until Training converged
3.3 Ensemble AT2L
We proceed to improve the robustness of the model against
unknown type of attacks for the reason that the originally
proposed algorithm can only defend against known type of
attacks, where defenders have detailed information about the
attacking methods and lack robustness against attacks trans-
ferred from unknown models. Our first attempt is to combine
different attack methods together to increase the robustness.
As shown in Algorithm 2 where A denotes an aggregation
of attack methods, we conduct adversarial training on a col-
lection of adversarial examples that are generated by all the
attack methods. In this paper, we consider three types of at-
tacks as follows:
• Gradient-based: A = {FGSM,LL, I-FGSM, I-LL}.
• Optimization-based: A = {C&W}.
• Mixed: A = {FGSM,LL, I-FGSM, I-LL,C&W}.
On the other hand, we adopt the idea of Ensemble Ad-
versarial Training [Trame`r et al., 2018], which says that the
augmentation of training data with perturbations transferred
from other models can improve the robustness not only under
a known type of attack, but also under an unknown type of
attack. As shown in Algorithm 2, whereM is a set of model
structures, we extend our training set with adversarial exam-
ples against different models inM .
In general, the ensemble version of our algorithm not only
considers various types of attacks, but also involves adver-
sarial examples generated against different model structures.
Therefore, our algorithm captures more information about the
decision boundary, and with our designed triplet loss, it can
smooth the classification boundary and learn a better embed-
ding space to alleviate the distortion.
3.4 Triplet regularization
Our triplet loss can also be regarded as a regularization term:
R(x, y) =
λ
k
k∑
i=1
max
{
‖f(xadvi )− f(xi)‖
− ‖f(xadvi )− f(x
n
i )‖+ α, 0
}
Thus, it can be incorporated into most of the existing de-
fense methods for better robustness. The defense methods
based on obfuscated gradients mostly mask the real gradient
by adding non-differentiable preprocessing or random pro-
cesses, and there is no restriction on the loss function used
in the training process. Therefore, we can modify their loss
function by adding our triplet regularization term to further
increase the robustness.
For example, Buckman et al. (2018) propose to encode
the input with Thermometer Encoding and retrain the model
with the traditional adversarial training. Triplet regulariza-
tion can be easily applied to this method by changing the
loss function of the adversarial training process. Mitigat-
ing through randomization [Xie et al., 2018] and Defense-
GAN [Samangouei et al., 2018] both perform transforma-
tions over original inputs without changing the loss. So we
can directly incorporate our triplet regularization into their
losses to improve the defense effect.
4 Experiments
In this section, we present experimental results.
4.1 Settings
We conduct experiments over three datasets, i.e., Cats vs.
Dogs [Elson et al., 2007], MNIST [LeCun, 1998] and CI-
FAR10 [Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009]. Cats vs. Dogs is a
large scale image dataset used for binary classification prob-
lems. MNIST and CIFAR10 are commonly used datasets for
multi-class classification problems.
The attack methods we used in our experiments include
FGSM, I-FGSM, LL, I-LL, C&W, LS-PGA and Deep-
fool [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016] and the model structures
used in the experiments are different for three datasets. The
parameters of these methods, detailed model structures and
full results of the experiments are described in the supple-
mental material1.
1https://github.com/njulpc/IJCAI19/blob/master/Appendix.pdf
Algorithm 2 Ensemble version of AT2L
1: Train f(·) with training dataX ;
2: repeat
3: for a in A do
4: for m inM do
5: ConstructXa,m, which is the set of adversarial examples ofX against modelm under the attack method a.
6: end for
7: end for
8: Xadv = {X
a,m}, a ∈ A,m ∈M ;
9: repeat
10: Sample k clean examplesB = {x1, ...,xk} from training set X ;
11: Sample k adversarial examples {xadv
1
, ...,xadvk } fromXadv. Each x
adv
i is the adversarial example of xi;
12: Construct a new training batch B′ = {x1, ...,xk,x
adv
1
, ...,xadvk };
13: For each instance of {xadv
1
, ...,xadvk }, take xi as x
p
i in triplet loss and sample an example from B with a different
label from xi as x
n
i in triplet loss;
14: Perform one training step of network f(·) using the mini-batchB′ according to Eq. (2);
15: until Training converged
16: until Training converged
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Figure 1: Results on three datasets where attackers perform white-box attacks. ‘Adv.T’ means the traditional adversarial training. ‘-Gra’
means the training process uses the gradient-based attack methods to generate adversarial examples. ‘-Opt’ means using optimization-based
attack method, i.e., C&W and ‘-Mix’ means using the mixed version of attack methods. The figures of the upper line are attacked by FGSM
and figures of the bottom line are attacked by C&W.
4.2 Adversarial Training with Triplet Loss (AT2L)
To illustrate the advantage of the proposed method, we com-
pare it with adversarial training without triplet loss, whose
loss function is Eq. (1). As for the hyper-parameters in Eq. (1)
and Eq. (2), we traverse in the appropriate interval and find
that they have a stable performance in a proper range of val-
ues. Each experiment is tested by two types of attack meth-
ods, i.e., FGSM and C&W. Due to the limitation of space, we
only show results where attackers perform white-box attacks
in Fig. 1 and partial results where defenders perform the at-
tack to a network which is not included in the training setM
of our algorithm in Fig. 2.
We have the following observations from the results in
Fig. 1: (i) when attacked by gradient-based attacks or
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Figure 2: Results on three datasets where defenders are under the attack of adversarial examples transferred from unknown models. Notations
are the same as Figure 1 and these are attacked by FGSM.
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Figure 3: Comparison of traditional adversarial training and triplet regularization. The attack method used is FGSM.
optimization-based attacks, AT2L trained with adversarial
examples generated by corresponding attacks has the best
robustness, e.g., when attacked by gradient-based attacks,
the model trained with adversarial examples generated by
gradient-based attacks exhibits the best robustness; (ii) when
trained with gradient-based attacks, AT2L shows almost
no robustness against optimization-based attacks, which is
shown by the black curves in Fig. 1. However, the robust-
ness of our algorithm trained with optimization-based attacks
demonstrates a decent defense effect against gradient-based
attacks. This briefly verifies that optimization-based attacks
are stronger and contain more information about the decision
boundary than gradient-based attacks; (iii) AT2L trained with
our mixed version of algorithms shows comparable robust-
ness to the model trained with corresponding attacks. Al-
though the mixed version of AT2L does not perform the best,
it provides more reliable robustness when attacked by an un-
known type of attacks.
Compared with Fig. 1 (results under adversarial examples
transferred from known models), Fig. 2 (results under ad-
versarial examples transferred from unknown models) shows
that the results under the attack transferred from unknown
models are slightly worse than that under the known type of
attacks for the reason that the defenders are lack of precise
information of the attack, e.g., the type of the attack method
and model structure used for attack. However, the model still
shows decent robustness against unknown type of attacks, and
this is an advantage of our ensemble AT2L, which aggregates
multiple model structures.
We also find that compared with the model trained over
clean data, all the models trained with our algorithm, i.e.,
AT2L, have no loss of accuracy, and more details can be
found in the supplemental material.
4.3 Triplet regularization
To reveal the effect of triplet regularization, we compare it
with the original adversarial training. We use FGSM to gen-
erate adversarial examples for the training process and test
the robustness by the attack of FGSM.
From Fig. 3, we can see that the error rate of the model
trained with our triplet regularization (the red curve) keeps
decreasing as the number of iterations increases. So the triplet
loss itself can increase the robustness of the model, and its
effect is no worse than the original adversarial training (the
blue curve). This result verifies our hypothesis that enlarging
the margin between the adversarial examples and the negative
examples and decreasing the margin between examples with
the same class can smooth the decision boundary. This also
suggests that the designed triplet regularization can work well
in most machine learning problems to increase robustness.
Ori Th. En.(1) Th. En.(7) Th. En. + TR(1) Th. En. + TR(7)
Clean 5.8 7.6 10.1 6.1 7.2
FGSM 51.5 37.1 20.0 27.6 15.1
PGD/LS-PGA 49.5 39.3 20.9 29.7 13.4
Table 1: Error rate against known type of attacks on CIFAR10 over Thermometer Models. ‘Th. En.’ mean Thermometer Encoding. ‘TR’
means applying our triplet regularization.
Model Inception-v3 ResNet-v2-101 Inception-ResNet-v2 Ens-adv-Inception-ResNet-v2
Ori Rand Rand + TR Ori Rand Rand + TR Ori Rand Rand + TR Ori Rand Rand + TR
FGSM 66.8 36.2 30.5 73.7 28.2 21.7 34.7 19.0 8.3 15.6 4.3 4.6
Deepfool 100.0 1.7 1.1 100.0 2.3 1.5 100.0 1.8 0.8 99.8 0.9 0.7
C&W 100.0 3.1 2.6 100.0 2.9 1.2 99.7 2.3 1.3 99.1 1.2 0.9
Table 2: Error rate of different models under the vanilla attack scenario on the ImageNet datasets. ‘Ori’ means the original model. ‘Rand’
means adding some randomization layers. ‘TR’ means applying our triplet regularization.
Model A B C D
Ori DG DG + TR Ori DG DG + TR Ori DG DG + TR Ori DG DG + TR
FGSM 88.3 1.2 1.1 97.8 4.4 0.7 67.9 1.1 0.8 96.2 2.0 1.6
C&W 85.9 1.1 1.4 96.8 8.4 4.7 87.4 1.1 1.1 96.8 1.7 1.4
Table 3: Error rates of different models on the MNIST datasets. ‘DG’ mean Defense-GAN. ‘TR’ means applying our triplet regularization.
A,B,C,D are different model structures, whose details are described in the supplemental material.
We can also see form Fig. 3 that AT2L, which integrates both
adversarial training and triplet regularization, shows the best
performance.
4.4 Current defense methods with triplet
regularization
We further explore the effect of the combination of triplet reg-
ularization with existing defense methods. We experiment
over some representative defense methods and demonstrate
that our triplet regularization can be applied to improve their
robustness further. Due to the limitation of space, we show
partial results in this part, and full results are listed in the
supplemental material.
Thermometer encoding
We follow the setting of the original pa-
per [Buckman et al., 2018] and do experiments over
both known and unknown type of attacks. Partial results
are shown in Table 1 which indicate employing our triplet
regularization indeed improves the robustness based on the
effect of the original defense. For example, when attacked by
FGSM, the error rate of the model trained using thermometer
encoding after 7 iterations is 20.0%. However, combining
with our triplet regularization, the model can achieve 15.1%
error rate.
Mitigating through randomization
We also apply our triplet loss to the work of Xie et al. (2018)
who proposed to randomly resize or pad the images to a
designed size. This defense can be added in front of nor-
mal classification process with no additional training or fine-
tuning, and can be combined with our triplet regularization
directly. We experiment over two settings from the origi-
nal paper (vanilla attack scenario and ensemble-pattern attack
scenario), and examine the performance of our triplet regular-
ization. The result of the vanilla attack scenario is shown in
Table 2. For the model of Inception-ResNet-v2, the random-
ized procedure only achieves 19.0% error rate under FGSM,
but with our triplet regularization, the error rate can drop to
9.3%. These results show that our triplet regularization can
further improve the robustness of the model based on the orig-
inal defense method.
Defense-GAN
Defense-GAN is designed to project samples onto the man-
ifold of the generator before classifying them. Our triplet
regularization can be easily applied after the projection of
Defense-GAN by simply changing the loss function dur-
ing the training process of the classifier. We follow the
setting of models’ structures and parameters in the paper
of Samangouei et al. (2018). As shown in Table 3, when
attacked by C&W, model B attains 8.4% error rate using
Defense-GAN, while combining with triplet regularization, it
achieves 4.7% error rate. Again, this result shows that equip-
ping the original defense method with triplet regularization
can make the trained model more robust.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose Adversarial Training with Triplet
Loss (AT2L), which incorporates a modified triplet loss in
the adversarial training process to alleviate the distortion of
the models’ classification boundary. We further design an en-
semble version of AT2L and propose to use the triple loss as
a regularization term. The results of our experiments validate
the effectiveness of our algorithms and demonstrate that our
triplet regularization can be applied to existing defense meth-
ods for further improvement of robustness.
Acknowledgments
This work was partially supported by the National Key R&D
Program of China (2018YFB1004300),NSFC-NRF Joint Re-
search Project (61861146001), YESS (2017QNRC001), and
the Collaborative Innovation Center of Novel Software Tech-
nology and Industrialization.
References
[Athalye et al., 2018] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and
David Wagner. Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of
security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00420, 2018.
[Buckman et al., 2018] Jacob Buckman, Aurko Roy, Colin
Raffel, and Ian Goodfellow. Thermometer encoding: One
hot way to resist adversarial examples. In Proceedings
of the International Conference on Learning Representa-
tions, 2018.
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017a] Nicholas Carlini and David
Wagner. Adversarial examples are not easily detected:
Bypassing ten detection methods. In Proceedings of the
10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Secu-
rity, pages 3–14. ACM, 2017.
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017b] Nicholas Carlini and David
Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural net-
works. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2017.
[Chen et al., 2017] Pin-Yu Chen, Yash Sharma, Huan Zhang,
Jinfeng Yi, and Cho-Jui Hsieh. Ead: elastic-net attacks
to deep neural networks via adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1709.04114, 2017.
[Dhillon et al., 2018] Guneet S Dhillon, Kamyar Azizzade-
nesheli, Zachary C Lipton, Jeremy Bernstein, Jean Kos-
saifi, Aran Khanna, and Anima Anandkumar. Stochastic
activation pruning for robust adversarial defense. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1803.01442, 2018.
[Elson et al., 2007] Jeremy Elson, John JD Douceur, Jon
Howell, and Jared Saul. Asirra: a captcha that exploits
interest-aligned manual image categorization. 2007.
[Evtimov et al., 2017] Ivan Evtimov, Kevin Eykholt, Ear-
lence Fernandes, Tadayoshi Kohno, Bo Li, Atul Prakash,
Amir Rahmati, and Dawn Song. Robust physical-world
attacks on machine learning models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.08945, 2017.
[Goodfellow et al., 2014] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon
Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572,
2014.
[He et al., 2017] Warren He, James Wei, Xinyun Chen,
Nicholas Carlini, and Dawn Song. Adversarial exam-
ple defenses: Ensembles of weak defenses are not strong.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.04701, 2017.
[Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009] Alex Krizhevsky and Geof-
frey Hinton. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny
images. 2009.
[Kurakin et al., 2016a] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow,
and Samy Bengio. Adversarial examples in the physical
world. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
[Kurakin et al., 2016b] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow,
and Samy Bengio. Adversarial machine learning at scale.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.01236, 2016.
[LeCun, 1998] Yann LeCun. The mnist database of hand-
written digits. http://yann. lecun. com/exdb/mnist/, 1998.
[Li et al., 2018] Pengcheng Li, Jinfeng Yi, and Lijun Zhang.
Query-efficient black-box attack by active learning. In
Proceedings of the 18th IEEE International Conference on
Data Mining, pages 1200–1205, 2018.
[Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-
Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. Deep-
fool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural
networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages
2574–2582, 2016.
[Ouyang and Wang, 2013] Wanli Ouyang and Xiaogang
Wang. Joint deep learning for pedestrian detection. In Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Com-
puter Vision, pages 2056–2063, 2013.
[Papernot et al., 2016] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel,
Somesh Jha, Matt Fredrikson, Z Berkay Celik, and Anan-
thram Swami. The limitations of deep learning in adver-
sarial settings. In 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Se-
curity and Privacy, pages 372–387. IEEE, 2016.
[Papernot et al., 2017] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel,
Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z Berkay Celik, and Anan-
thram Swami. Practical black-box attacks against machine
learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, pages
506–519. ACM, 2017.
[Samangouei et al., 2018] Pouya Samangouei, Maya
Kabkab, and Rama Chellappa. Defense-gan: Protecting
classifiers against adversarial attacks using generative
models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.06605, 2018.
[Schroff et al., 2015] Florian Schroff, Dmitry Kalenichenko,
and James Philbin. Facenet: A unified embedding for face
recognition and clustering. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
pages 815–823, 2015.
[Szegedy et al., 2013] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech
Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian
Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of
neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[Trame`r et al., 2018] Florian Trame`r, Alexey Kurakin, Nico-
las Papernot, Dan Boneh, and Patrick McDaniel. Ensem-
ble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses. In Proceed-
ings of the International Conference on Learning Repre-
sentations, 2018.
[Xie et al., 2018] Cihang Xie, JianyuWang, Zhishuai Zhang,
Zhou Ren, and Alan Yuille. Mitigating adversarial effects
through randomization. In Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
[Xu et al., 2017] Xiaojun Xu, Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu,
Anna Rohrbach, Trevor Darell, and Dawn Song. Can you
fool ai with adversarial examples on a visual turing test?
arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.08693, 2017.
[Yuan et al., 2014] Zhenlong Yuan, Yongqiang Lu, Zhaoguo
Wang, and Yibo Xue. Droid-sec: deep learning in android
malware detection. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Com-
munication Review, volume 44, pages 371–372. ACM,
2014.
Appendix
We showmore details about our experiments in this appendix.
Our experiments mainly contain two parts, the first one is to
examine whether the new triplet loss function can improve
the performance of adversarial training or not, and the per-
formance when triplet loss is taken as a regularization. The
second one is to apply our new triplet loss function to cur-
rent defense methods. We do experiments over three datasets
for the first part, Cats vs. Dogs, MNIST and CIFAR10. For
the second part, we follow the setting of the original papers
of these defense methods. Our new triplet loss is defined as
follows,
ℓˆ(x, y) =
1
(1 + λ1)k
(∑
i∈k
ℓ(xi, y) + λ1
∑
i∈k
ℓ(xadvi , y)
)
+
λ2
k
∑
i
max
{
‖f(xadvi )− f(xi)‖
− ‖f(xadvi )− f(x
n
i )‖ + α, 0
}
A Adversarial Training with Triplet Loss
(AT2L)
In this section, we show results over three datasets, Cats vs.
Dogs, MNIST and CIFAR10. The attack methods used in
this part are FGSM, I-FGSM, LL, I-LL and C&W. We set
ǫ as 0.3, which is the scale of FGSM, I-FGSM, LL and I-
LL. For iteration algorithms like I-FGSM and I-LL, we set
the number of iteration as 10 and ǫ = 0.03 for each itera-
tion. The max-iteration of C&W is set to be 1000. The initial
constant c is set to be 1e−3 and the largest value of c to go
up to before giving up is 2. The rate at which we increase
constant is 2 and the learning rate of C&W attack is 5e−3.
The performance of our algorithm is stable in a large range
of the hyper-parameters. λ1 and λ2 are designed to adjust the
weight of the original loss, adversarial loss and triplet loss. α
is designed to tune the margin between different classes. In
our experiments, with fixed λ2, the robustness of the model
is stable when λ1 varies from 0.2 to 1.5. With fixed λ1, the
robustness is stable when λ2 varies from 0.1 to 5. As for α
in the triplet loss, the robustness is stable when varying from
0.1 to 2.0 with step-size 0.1.
A.1 Cats vs. Dogs
We first do experiments on Cats vs. Dogs dataset. The
model structures we chose are VGG16, VGG19, inceptionv3,
resnet50. Here we use FGSM, I-FGSM, LL, and I-LL to gen-
erate adversarial examples and notate these methods as gradi-
ent training methods and we select C&W as the optimization
attack method for the purpose of adversarial training. The
margin α and λ is set to be 0.5 and 0.3. We train an ensemble
model which covers VGG16, VGG19, inceptionv3, resnet50
because each picture of this dataset is 224x224x3 and simple
networks may not work well. The accuracy of the model over
clean data is 91.2%.
The known type of attack is proposed to train an ensem-
ble model over model VGG16, VGG19, inceptionv3 and
resnet50 when the original model f(·) is VGG16. We then
attack the model with the adversarial examples generated
against model VGG16. The unknown type of attack is de-
signed to train the ensemble model over model VGG19,
inceptionv3 and resnet50 when the original model f(·) is
VGG19. We then attack the model with the adversarial ex-
amples generated against model VGG16 so that the attackers
are not ware of the model’s structure during the training pro-
cess.
The accuracy of adversarial training with triplet loss
against gradient-based adversarial examples is 4.7%, which
is better than normal adversarial training without triplet loss.
Even after 10 iterations of adversarial training, the algo-
rithm of adversarial training with triplet loss is still bet-
ter. When trained with optimization-based algorithm like
C&W, the robustness against gradient-based adversarial ex-
amples is worse than when trained with gradient-based algo-
rithm. However, the mixed version of both gradient-based
and optimization-based algorithm works well regardless of
the type of the attack.
The parameters in the triplet loss function are set to be
λ1 = 0.3, λ2 = 1, α = 1.0, and the results are shown in
Figure 1, Figure 2, Table 1, and Table 2.
A.2 MNIST
We then tested our algorithm on MNIST. The size of instance
of MNIST is not as large as the instance of Cats vs. Dogs, but
the number of classes is a bit larger. Each picture ofMNIST is
28x28x1, so we construct 4 different models for the ensemble
training process (which are shown in the Table 6). Model
A, B, C are CNNs with different constructions, and model D
only contains multiply dense layers and dropout layers. We
perform a known type of attack and a unknown type of attack
on this dataset.
The known type of attack is proposed to train an ensemble
model over model A, B, C and D (M in algorithm 2 is set
to be [A, B, C, D]) and then attack the model with the ad-
versarial examples generated against model A. Here we use
FGSM, I-FGSM, LL, I-LL and a combination of these 4 al-
gorithms to generate adversarial examples for training. The
model we pre-trained (Step 1 of Algorithm 2) reaches up to
99.1% accuracy. The parameter k is 32, λ1 is 0.3, λ2 = 1.0
and α is set to be 1.0. The model after normal adversar-
ial training or adversarial training with triplet loss does not
lose the accuracy, its accuracy is still over 99% on average.
We also do more experiments about the performance of dif-
ferent gradient-based attack methods and their combination.
The result shows that AT2L can increase the robustness of the
Attack method Training method Adv. Train(1) Adv. Train(10) AT2L(1) AT2L(10)
FGSM
Gradient-based 18.3 11.6 13.6 8.3
Optimization-based 32.6 26.5 27.4 16.3
Mixed 20.8 19.6 13.7 11.3
C&W
Gradient-based 93.5 96.2 95.2 93.1
Optimization-based 27.4 24.1 16.2 13.7
Mixed 25.3 22.2 17.3 12.0
Table 4: Error rate of known type of attack on Cats vs. Dogs. We train over model VGG16, VGG19, inceptionv3, resnet50, and we test the
error rate over model VGG16. Baseline is traditional adversarial training. We use different algorithm to generate adversarial examples for
training.
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Figure 4: Results on Cats vs. Dogs dataset. ‘Adv.T’ means traditional adversarial training. ‘-Gra’ means the training process use the gradient-
based algorithms to generate adversarial examples. ‘-Opt’ means optimization-based algorithm C&W and ‘-Mix’ means mixed version of
algorithm.
Attack method Training method Adv. Train(1) Adv. Train(10) AT2L(1) AT2L(10)
FGSM
Gradient-based 42.6 25.7 21.5 15.2
Optimization-based 43.7 35.9 32.9 19.2
Mixed 41.3 22.7 23.8 12.5
C&W
Gradient-based 99.3 95.4 92.1 94.6
Optimization-based 32.8 30.3 18.3 15.2
Mixed 27.6 24.6 19.5 13.5
Table 5: Error rate of unknown type of attack on Cats vs. Dogs. We train over model VGG16, VGG19, inceptionv3, resnet50, and we test
the error rate over model VGG16. Baseline is traditional adversarial training. We use different algorithm to generate adversarial examples for
training.
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Figure 5: Results on Cats vs. Dogs dataset. ‘Adv.T’ means traditional adversarial training. ‘-Gra’ means the training process use the gradient-
based algorithms to generate adversarial examples. ‘-Opt’ means optimization-based algorithm C&W and ‘-Mix’ means mixed version of
algorithm.
model. When training with the mixed version, the robustness
against corresponding attack methods shows the best perfor-
mance.
The unknown type of attack is proposed to train an ensem-
ble model over model A, B and D (M in algorithm 2 is set to
be [A, B, D]) and then attack the model with the adversarial
examples generated against model C. Other settings are the
same as the experiments of known type of attack. The result
is quite similar as known type of attack, and the mixed ver-
sion of AT2Lwhich is trained by adversarial examples against
both gradient-based algorithms and optimization-based algo-
rithms shows the lowest error rate.
The parameters in the triplet loss function are set to be
λ1 = 0.3, λ2 = 1, α = 1.0, and the results are shown in
Figure 3, Figure 4, Table 4, and Table 5. The model struc-
tures we used in the experiments are shown in Table 3.
A.3 CIFAR10
MNIST is a standard dataset in the research of adversarial ex-
amples, but it’s a small dataset and we further do more exper-
iments over CIFAR10. The models we choose for CIFAR10
are the same as the Cats vs. Dogs dataset: VGG16, VGG19,
inceptionv3 and resnet50.
We also do a known type of attack and a unknown type
of attack on CIFAR10. The known type of attack proposes
to train an ensemble model over model VGG16, VGG19,
inceptionv3 and resnet50 (M in algorithm 2 is set to be
[VGG16, VGG19, inceptionv3, resnet50]) and then attack the
model with the adversarial examples generated against model
VGG16. The unknown type of attack is proposed to train
over models mentioned above without VGG16 and attack the
model against VGG16. The setting of parameters over both
attacks are the same: k = 32, α = 1.0, λ1 = 0.6, λ2 = 1.0.
The accuracy of the pre-trained model (Step 1 of Algorithm
2) reaches up to 92.6% and the accuracy does not decrease
much after adversarial training (near 92%). The results of un-
known type of attack are a little worse than the known type of
attack, but the robustness of the model indeed increases. The
error rate of the original model against FGSM is 90.1% and
that of the original model against C&W is 99.2%. From the
results we can see that our AT2L trained over ensemble mod-
els and mixed attack methods shows the best performance
against both gradient-based and optimization-based attack.
The triplet loss can increase the robustness of the model better
than the normal adversarial training without triplet loss.
The model structures used to generate adversarial exam-
ples are the same as the setting of dataset Cats vs. Dogs. We
experiment both known type of and unknown type of settings
and the result shows that our special triplet loss can improve
the robustness of the model better than traditional adversarial
training process. The results are shown in Figure 5, Figure 6,
Table 6, and Table 7.
B Apply to current defense
The second part of our experiment is to apply our new loss
to the existence defense methods. We choose three typical
defense methods described in the paper, thermometer encod-
ing, mitigating through randomization, and Defense-GAN.
We propose to improve the robustness of the model based on
these defenses.
B.1 Thermometer encoding
Thermometer encoding used a phenomenon called Gradient
Shattering. This defense is designed to encode the original
input to a non-differentiable image and the original defense
is combined with a traditional adversarial training process.
So our triplet regularization can be easily inserted into this
defense. We only need to change the loss function during the
adversarial training process to our new loss function and we
do not need to generate different types of adversarial exam-
ples or against different model structures. In this experiment,
we view the image after the thermometer encoding as the ad-
versarial examples. In the known type of setting, we use the
same model structure in both training and testing process and
in the unknown type of setting we apply different structures.
A B C D
Input Input Input Input
Conv(64,5,5) Conv(64,8,8) Conv(128,3,3) Dense(300)
ReLu ReLu ReLu ReLu
Conv(64,5,5) Conv(128,6,6) Conv(64,3,3) Dropout
ReLu ReLu ReLu Dense(300)
Dropout Conv(128,5,5) Dropout ReLu
Dense(128) ReLu Flatten Dropout
ReLu Dropout Dense(128) Dense(300)
Dropout Flatten ReLu ReLu
Dense(10) Dense(10) Dropout Dropout
Dense(10) Dense(10)
Table 6: Structures of models on MNIST.
Attack method Training method Adv. Train(1) Adv. Train(10) AT2L(1) AT2L(10)
FGSM
FGSM 56.9 42.0 54.0 34.8
iter FGSM 83.3 88.3 66.6 38.3
LL 56.7 48.1 46.2 42.9
iter LL 87.9 83.8 53.0 44.1
Gradient-based 58.3 46.3 51.8 40.3
Optimization-based 85.2 84.2 68.9 59.6
Mixed 86.7 54.9 55.9 37.2
C&W
FGSM 91.6 86.8 91.1 88.6
iter FGSM 83.0 88.9 77.9 85.2
LL 82.6 91.3 86.8 88.5
iter LL 79.8 84.2 89.9 85.2
Gradient-based 84.1 88.7 83.5 89.3
Optimization-based 56.4 56.1 43.3 45.2
Mixed 62.2 55.7 39.5 23.5
Table 7: Error rate of known type of attack on MNIST. We train over model A,B,C,D, and we test the error rate over model A. Baseline is
traditional adversarial training. We use different algorithm to generate adversarial examples for training. We then use FGSM or C&W for
testing the robustness.
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Figure 6: Results on MNIST dataset of known type of attack. ‘Adv.T’ means traditional adversarial training. ‘-Gra’ means the training
process use the gradient-based algorithms to generate adversarial examples. ‘-Opt’ means optimization-based algorithm C&W and ‘-Mix’
means mixed version of algorithm.
Attack method Training method Adv. Train(1) Adv. Train(10) AT2L(1) AT2L(10)
FGSM
FGSM 59.3 52.6 52.1 45.2
iter FGSM 83.5 85.8 63.6 49.1
LL 62.1 54.7 45.3 38.5
iter LL 82.5 86.1 51.9 45.1
Gradient-based 67.4 53.5 54.1 42.2
Optimization-based 86.1 87.8 59.2 55.3
Mixed 61.4 58.2 51.6 39.1
C&W
FGSM 95.1 97.5 95.2 92.9
iter FGSM 95.8 94.2 87.2 89.1
LL 94.1 93.2 93.9 86.6
iter LL 97.9 94.7 98.5 83.1
Gradient-based 91.3 95.1 95.9 97.2
Optimization-based 58.3 57.8 46.1 43.3
Mixed 64.9 53.1 47.3 32.7
Table 8: Error rate of unknown type of attack on MNIST. We train over model A,B,D, and we test the error rate over model C. Baseline is
traditional adversarial training. We use different algorithm to generate adversarial examples for training. We then use FGSM or C&W for
testing the robustness.
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Figure 7: Results on MNIST dataset of unknown type of attack. ‘Adv.T’ means traditional adversarial training. ‘-Gra’ means the training
process use the gradient-based algorithms to generate adversarial examples. ‘-Opt’ means optimization-based algorithm C&W and ‘-Mix’
means mixed version of algorithm.
Attack method Training method Adv. Train(1) Adv. Train(10) AT2L(1) AT2L(10)
FGSM
Gradient-based 64.2 50.3 49.6 41.8
Optimization-based 74.3 81.9 63.1 62.8
Mixed 66.3 63.7 57.2 44.3
C&W
Gradient-based 97.1 98.8 96.3 97.9
Optimization-based 53.9 43.0 46.1 35.7
Mixed 62.5 61.1 53.9 44.4
Table 9: Error rate of known type of attack on CIFAR10. We train over model VGG16, VGG19, inceptionv3, resnet50, and we test the error
rate over model VGG16. Baseline is traditional adversarial training. We use different algorithm to generate adversarial examples for training.
We then use FGSM or C&W for testing the robustness.
Attack method Training method Adv. Train(1) Adv. Train(10) AT2L(1) AT2L(10)
FGSM
Gradient-based 67.6 53.1 45.1 41.6
Optimization-based 84.9 88.3 77.3 71.4
Mixed 73.8 69.2 61.7 50.9
C&W
Gradient-based 98.5 97.3 98.5 98.8
Optimization-based 57.6 50.7 51.1 45.7
Mixed 69.4 63.6 56.8 47.3
Table 10: Error rate of unknown type of attack on CIFAR10. We train over model VGG19, inceptionv3, resnet50, and we test the error rate
over model VGG16. Baseline is traditional adversarial training. We use different algorithm to generate adversarial examples for training. We
then use FGSM or C&W for testing the robustness.
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Figure 8: Results on CIFAR10 dataset of known type of attack. ‘Adv.T’ means traditional adversarial training. ‘-Gra’ means the training
process use the gradient-based algorithms to generate adversarial examples. ‘-Opt’ means optimization-based algorithm C&W and ‘-Mix’
means mixed version of algorithm.
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Figure 9: Results on CIFAR10 dataset of unknown type of attack. ‘Adv.T’ means traditional adversarial training. ‘-Gra’ means the training
process use the gradient-based algorithms to generate adversarial examples. ‘-Opt’ means optimization-based algorithm C&W and ‘-Mix’
means mixed version of algorithm.
We show the results of the first round of adversarial training
and the results after 7 rounds of training.
The parameters in the triplet loss function are set to be
λ1 = 0.3, λ2 = 0.7, α = 1.5, and the results are shown in
Table 8-11. In each table, we test our model with three types
of examples, i.e. clean data, examples generated by FGSM,
and examples generated by PGDLS-PGA.
B.2 Mitigating through randomization
Mitigating through randomization uses Stochastic Gradients
which are caused by randomized defenses. The input is ran-
domly transformed before being fed to the classifier, causing
the gradients to become randomized. The target models and
the defense models are exactly the same except for the param-
eter settings of the randomization layers, i.e., the randomiza-
tion parameters of the target models are predefined while ran-
domization parameters of the defense models are randomly
generated at test time.
The traditional adversarial training process is also men-
tioned in the original paper. So our special triplet regular-
ization can be easily applied to this defense. We also drop
the use of different types of adversarial examples and differ-
ent model structures used to improve the effect of adversarial
training. We select two attack scenarios, the vanilla attack
scenario and the ensemble-pattern attack scenario in our ex-
periment.
The parameters in the triplet loss function are set to be
λ1 = 0.3, λ2 = 1, α = 2.0, and the results are shown in Ta-
ble 12-13. We use three different attack methods, i.e., FGSM,
Deepfool, and C&W, to test the effect of the defense.
B.3 Defense-GAN
Defense-GAN used Vanishing & Exploding Gradients. This
defense do not affect the training and testing of classifier. The
adversarial training process was even used in the original pa-
per and got a well performance. So we apply our triplet regu-
larization under the same setting of parameters and the result
shows that the new loss can improve the robustness based on
the original defense.
The parameters in the triplet loss function are set to be
λ1 = 0.3, λ2 = 0.5, α = 2.0, and Defense-GAN has
L = 200 and R = 10. The results are shown in Table 14
and the model structures are listed in Table 15.
Ori Th. En.(1) Th. En.(7) Th. En.+ Tri. Reg(1) Th. En.+ Tri. Reg(7)
Clean 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8
FGSM 100.0 31.6 4.2 28.7 3.5
PGD/LS-PGA 100.0 25.0 5.9 23.0 2.7
Table 11: Error rate of known type of attacks on MNIST over Thermometer Models. ‘Th. En.’ mean Thermometer Encoding. ‘Tri. Reg’
means applying our triplet regularization.
Ori Th. En.(1) Th. En.(7) Th. En.+ Tri. Reg(1) Th. En.+ Tri. Reg(7)
Clean 5.8 7.6 10.1 6.1 7.2
FGSM 51.5 37.1 20.0 27.6 15.1
PGD/LS-PGA 49.5 39.3 20.9 29.7 13.4
Table 12: Error rate of known type of attacks on CIFAR10 over Thermometer Models. ‘Th. En.’ mean Thermometer Encoding. ‘Tri. Reg’
means applying our triplet regularization.
Ori Th. En.(1) Th. En.(7) Th. En.+ Tri. Reg(1) Th. En.+ Tri. Reg(7)
Clean 3.5 5.1 5.5 5.0 9.2
FGSM 89.1 73.7 67.0 53.1 47.9
PGD/LS-PGA 88.2 77.1 71.9 62.8 55.3
Table 13: Error rate of unknown type of attacks on MNIST over Thermometer Models. ‘Th. En.’ mean Thermometer Encoding. ‘Tri. Reg’
means applying our triplet regularization.
Ori Th. En.(1) Th. En.(7) Th. En.+ Tri. Reg(1) Th. En.+ Tri. Reg(7)
Clean 11.5 13.6 20.1 16.2 17.7
FGSM 46.5 43.8 39.1 38.6 33.0
PGD/LS-PGA 55.0 52.9 49.3 51.9 43.0
Table 14: Error rate of unknown type of attacks on CIFAR10 over Thermometer Models. ‘Th. En.’ mean Thermometer Encoding. ‘Tri. Reg’
means applying our triplet regularization.
Models Inception-v3 ResNet-v2-101 Inception-ResNet-v2 Ens-adv-Inception-ResNet-v2
Ori Rand
Rand+
Tri. Reg
Ori Rand
Rand+
Tri. Reg
Ori Rand
Rand+
Tri. Reg
Ori Rand
Rand+
Tri. Reg
FGSM 66.8 36.2 30.5 73.7 28.2 21.7 34.7 19.0 8.3 15.6 4.3 4.6
Deepfool 100.0 1.7 1.1 100.0 2.3 1.5 100.0 1.8 0.8 99.8 0.9 0.7
C&W 100.0 3.1 2.6 100.0 2.9 1.2 99.7 2.3 1.3 99.1 1.2 0.9
Table 15: Top-1 classification error rate under the vanilla attack scenario. ‘Ori’ means the original model. ‘Rand’ means adding some
randomization layers. ‘Tri. Reg’ means applying our triplet regularization.
Models Inception-v3 ResNet-v2-101 Inception-ResNet-v2 Ens-adv-Inception-ResNet-v2
Ori Rand
Rand+
Tri. Reg
Ori Rand
Rand+
Tri. Reg
Ori Rand
Rand+
Tri. Reg
Ori Rand
Rand +
Tri. Reg
FGSM 62.7 58.8 37.3 60.8 55.1 45.1 28.5 25.7 23.5 13.8 11.1 8.9
Deepfool 99.4 18.7 17.7 99.1 19.5 22.2 99.1 30.6 41.6 98.4 6.5 9.0
C&W 99.4 37.1 23.1 99.0 25.7 20.0 98.4 31.7 21.7 94.2 13.9 7.4
Table 16: Top-1 classification error rate under the ensemble-pattern attack scenario. Similar to vanilla attack and single-pattern attack
scenarios, we see that randomization layers increase the accuracy under all attacks and networks. This clearly demonstrates the effectiveness
of the proposed randomization method on defending against adversarial examples, even under this very strong attack scenario. ‘Ori’ means
the original model. ‘Rand’ means adding some randomization layers. ‘Tri. Reg’ means applying our triplet regularization.
Attack Model
No
Attack
No
Defense
Defense-
GAN-Rec
Adv.
Train
AT2L
Defense-
GAN-Rec
+ Tri. Reg
FGSM
A 0.3 88.3 1.2 34.9 23.6 1.1
B 3.8 97.8 4.4 94.0 96.8 0.7
C 0.4 67.9 1.1 21.4 11.9 0.8
D 0.8 96.2 2.0 26.8 15.2 1.6
C&W
A 0.3 85.9 1.1 92.3 96.5 1.4
B 3.8 96.8 8.4 72.0 70.7 4.7
C 0.4 87.4 1.1 96.9 93.7 1.1
D 0.8 96.8 1.7 99.0 87.7 1.4
Table 17: Classification error rates of different classifier models using various defense strategies on the MNIST datasets, under FGSM and
C&W known type of attacks. ‘Adv. Train’ mean a traditional adversarial training process. ‘Tri. Reg’ means applying our triplet regularization.
A B C D Generator Discriminator
Conv(64,5x5,1) Dropout(0.2) Conv(128,3x3,1) FC(200) FC(4096) Conv(64,5x5,2)
ReLU Conv(64,8x8,2) ReLU ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU(0.2)
Conv(64,5x5,2) ReLU Conv(64,3x3,2) Dropout(0.5) ConvT(256,5x5,1) Conv(128,5x5,2)
ReLU Conv(128,6x6,2) ReLU FC(200) ReLU LeakyReLU(0.2)
Dropout(0.25) ReLU Dropout(0.25) ReLU ConvT(128,5x5,1) Conv(256,5x5,2)
FC(128) Conv(128,5x5,1) FC(128) Dropout(0.5) ReLU LeakyReLU(0.2)
ReLU ReLU ReLU FC(10)+Softmax ConvT(1,5x5,1) FC(1)
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Sigmoid Sigmoid
FC(10)+Softmax FC(10)+Softmax FC(10)+Softmax
Table 18: Neural network architectures used for classifiers, substitute models and GANs.
